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PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, AND JUDGING
A judge often calls on "history" to decide a case. Because history
plays such a large role in judicial decisions, an inquiry into the phi-
losophy of history may shed some light on judges' handling of dif-
ferent types of history, and their own philosophy on the matter.
This Note reviews the philosophy of history as it relates to the
decision-making process in judging. Many commentators have dis-
cussed judges' use of history as a decisional tool-but few have in-
quired into the significance of a judge's idea of what history is.
Two judges with different ideas of the nature of history will use
that history in different ways. The Note uses recent cases on reli-
gion in the public schools to demonstrate the use of history by a
district judge and the United States Supreme Court. The Note
concludes with an appeal for a greater historical awareness on the
part of judges.
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
Inquiring into the nature of history' is a matter of epistemology.
The reader of history seeks an authoritative version of past
events.2 History may be one of the oldest of the sciences: stories,
1. "History" will be used in two different senses throughout this Note: History as what
people believe is true about past events and history as what in fact occurred in the past,
although current beliefs may conflict with that truth. See C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE USES OF HISTORY 20 (1969).
2. The historian Eric Hobsbawm recently discussed the difficulties facing the historian
who attempts to report on the immediate past:
Where historians try to come to grips with a period which has left surviving
eyewitnesses, two quite different concepts of history clash, or, in the best of
cases, supplement each other: the scholarly and the existential, archive and
personal memory. For everyone is a historian of his or her own consciously
lived lifetime inasmuch as he or she comes to terms with it in the mind-an
unreliable historian from most points of view, as anyone knows who has ven-
tured into "oral history", but one whose contribution is essential. Scholars who
interview old soldiers or politicians will have already acquired more, and more
reliable, information about what happened from print and paper, than their
source has in his or her memory, but may nevertheless misunderstand it. And,
unlike, say, the historian of the crusades, the historian of the Second World
War can be corrected by those who, remembering, shake their head and tell
him or her: "But it was not like that at all." Nevertheless, both the versions of
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whether true or false, have circulated as long as people have won-
dered what happened before them.'
The eighteenth-century historian Giambattista Vico believed
that history was a more proper study than the natural sciences:
[I]n the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiq-
uity, so remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and
never failing light of a truth beyond all question: that the world
of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its
principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of
our own human mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot but mar-
vel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to
the study of the world of nature, which, since God made it, He
alone knows .... 4
One knows best what one has made oneself. The study of history
for Vico, and for those who agree with his assessment, is thus one
of self-discovery-of the individual self and of the culture. Some
philosophers deny our ability to recapture the past; without having
been there in person, they say, no true knowledge of the events can
come to us at this remove. Yet, this inevitable uncertainty should
not compel the conclusion that historiography is a hopeless
endeavor.5
Thinkers of many Western countries and of strikingly dissimilar
backgrounds and approaches have tackled the philosophy of his-
tory" with varying degrees of success. Each seems to come to a dif-
history which thus confront one another are, in different senses, coherent con-
structions of the past, consciously held as such and at least potentially capable
of definition.
E. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EmPiRE 1875-1914, at 4-5 (1987). Although the world of eight-
eenth-century America is certainly closer to us than the world of Richard the Lionhearted,
the constitutional scholar has no reason to fear that a masterful analysis will yield to the
unrelenting testimony of an eyewitness to the events of 1787. Critics of a constitutional
history are likely to be much more passionate than those who dispute the departure date of
the Third Crusade.
3. See G. Vico, THE NEW SCIENCE OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO (T.B. Bergin & M.H. Fisch rev.
trans. 1968) (3d ed. 1744).
4. Id. at 96.
5. See M. COHEN, THE MEANING OF HUMAN HISTORY 22 (1947).
6. The phrase "philosophy of history" was invented in the eighteenth century by
Voltaire, who meant by it no more than critical or scientific history, a type of
historical thinking in which the historian made up his mind for himself instead
of repeating whatever stories he found in old books. The same name was used
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ferent conclusion as to the nature and use of such a philosophy.7
Doubters of historical truth still exist today.8 Even the most opti-
mistic historian can agree that the past is not completely knowa-
ble; but then, neither is the present. A modern commentator notes:
"[T]he perplexing paradox of all historical work is that what actu-
ally happened can never be recaptured, although historical re-
search would lose its point without a belief that more of it can be
recaptured than is presently known."9 Still, "[t]he fundamental as-
sumption of the model of history as description is that good his-
tory can accurately portray past reality."10
The method of historical research varies from individual to indi-
vidual, but historiographers have classified the dominant ap-
proaches as "scissors-and-paste" and "scientific." A type of history
that one finds all too often in judicial opinions is the "scissors-and-
paste" method. The historian, or judge, searches for testimony of
witnesses to the past events and, by cutting them out and pasting
them together, creates a story that seems authoritative. Little or
no analysis of these witnesses may follow.11
by Hegel and other writers at the end of the eighteenth century; but they gave
it a different sense and regarded it as meaning simply universal or world his-
tory. A third use of the phrase is found in several nineteenth-century posi-
tivists for whom the philosophy of history was the discovery of general laws
governing the course of the events which it was history's business to recount.
R. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 1 (1956).
7. See id.
8. The historian Carl Becker wrote that one's view of history is so inextricably linked to
the way one lives that history differs from person to person and generation to generation.
See C. BECKER, Everyman His Own Historian, in EvERYmAN His OWN HISTORIAN 242-43
(1935). For criticism of this approach in Becker and other writers, see M. MANDELBAUM, THE
PROBLEM OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE: AN ANSWER TO RELATIvISM (1967).
9. Friedrich, Law and History, 14 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1031 (1961).
10. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 1237,
1246 (1986).
11. History constructed by excerpting and combining the testimonies of different
authorities I call scissors-and-paste history .... [I]t is not really history at all,
because it does not satisfy the necessary conditions of science; but until lately
it was the only kind of history in existence, and a great deal of the history
people are still reading to-day, and even a good deal of what people are still
writing, belongs to this type.
R. COLLINGWOOD, supra note 6, at 257-58.
Alfred H. Kelly referred to this practice as "law-office history" in a criticism of the Su-
preme Court's historical approaches. He deplored "the selection of data favorable to the
position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper eval-
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The historian and philosopher R.G. Collingwood decried the pit-
iful example of the "scissors-and-paste" historian. He asserted that
the more properly practicing "scientific" historian does not merely
pass on collected facts to his readers as historical truth, but in-
stead makes a critical choice about the "facts" that he has
discovered:
[T]he scientific historian does not treat statements as state-
ments but as evidence: not as true or false accounts of the facts
of which they profess to be accounts, but as other facts which, if
he knows the right questions to ask about them, may throw light
on those facts .... The scissors-and-paste historian is interested
in the "content," as it is called, of statements; he is interested in
what they state. The scientific historian is interested in the fact
that they are made. 2
Although the method seems silly by Collingwood's description,
"scissors-and-paste" historiography was, nevertheless, during the
nineteenth century, mainstream contemporary historical thinking.
A twentieth-century mind, looking back through a nineteenth-cen-
tury "scissors-and-paste" historian's work, may find little to ad-
mire in that once-popular approach.' 3 Most writers on historiogra-
phy agree, however, that a purely "scientific" history-a history
uncluttered by the passions and superstitions of the histo-
rian-could never be written, and, more important, might never be
read.14
uation of the relevance of the data proffered." Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love
Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119, 122 n.13.
12. R. COLLINGWOOD, supra note 6, at 275.
13. Edmund Wilson, for example, wrote of Hippolyte Taine:
Taine was always emphasizing the scientific value of the "little significant
fact." Here, he says, he will merely present the evidence and allow us to make
our own conclusions; but it never seems to occur to him that we may ask our-
selves who it is that is selecting the evidence and why he is making this partic-
ular choice. It never seems to occur to him that we may accuse him of having
conceived the simplification first and then having collected the evidence to fit
it; or that we may have been made skeptical at the outset by the very assump-
tion on his part that there is nothing he cannot catalogue with certainty under
a definite number of heads with Roman numerals, in so complex, so confused,
so disorderly and so rapid a human crisis as the great French Revolution.
E. WILSON, To THE FINLAND STATION 51-52 (1940) (emphasis added),
14. For undoubtedly there can be no history without a point of view; like the natu-
ral sciences, history must be selective unless it is to be choked by a flood of
[Vol. 30:181
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Nietzsche's Three Historians: Critical Food for Thought
Despite the method of historical research chosen, problems re-
main. The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche identified
some of these problems when he examined historical practice in
the nineteenth century, and his criticisms are applicable to today's
scissors-and-paste and scientific historians. Friedrich Nietzsche
had an organic view of history: history was a living thing with
which living humans must contend.15 Nietzsche discussed this
problem in an early essay, On the Use and Disadvantage of His-
tory for Life.' In that essay Nietzsche discussed three methods of
poor and unrelated material.... But as a rule, these historical "approaches" or
"points of view" cannot be tested. They cannot be refuted, and apparent con-
firmations are therefore of no value, even if they are as numerous as the stars
in the sky.
K. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF IISTORICISM 150-51 (1957).
15. Karl Jaspers described Nietzsche's approach:
Historical science is not timelessly valid knowledge of a finished and unchang-
ing state of affairs; rather history (Historie) as knowledge changes with history
(Geschichte) understood as a series of actual occurrences within the world.
Nothing past is unalterably dead: Whatever issued from an authentic source
lives on beyond a new present to undergo unforeseeable transformations. It is
forgotten and again revived, it is discovered after seemingly having been
known for some time, and it provides a new impulse after it has long been
regarded as insignificant.
K JASPERS, NmTzscHF: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF His PHMIOSOPHmcAL Ac-
TIrrrY 236-37 (1965).
Nietzsche, although not a historian by profession, had important things to say about the
historiographical practices of his time. Yet, one writer warns: "[A]lthough Nietzsche may be
among the most stimulating of writers, he is the unsafest and most erratic guide imagina-
ble." P. GEYL, USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY 53 (1955). One can use Nietzsche's criticisms,
however, without adopting all other statements that he made. Nietzsche's invocation of
myth impressed one historian who found fault in the philosopher's other views:
The truth is that societies and nations live and shape their policies by the
myths they believe in, and hence arises the ethical responsibility of the histo-
rian. Such myths are ideological interpretations of history and their primary
virtue is that they should be useful. Their function is to secure social cohesion,
to assure the common man that he belongs to a cause greater than himself, and
to create the blissful expectation of well-being hereafter. It is not necessary
that the myth should be true, but only that it should be "useful." Though
ostensibly it interprets the past, its real concern is the future; history is the
screen on which the ideal future is projected. Myth is essentially "practical
history."
A. RICHARDSON, HISTORY SACRED AND PROFANE 244-45 (1964).
16. F. NIarZSCHE, On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life, in UNTIMELY MEDI-
TATIONS (R. Hollingdale trans. 1983).
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history: the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical.1" His-
tory, wrote Nietzsche, is dangerous because its misuse can affect
the way people live in the present.
Monumental history springs from an awe of past actors and
events:
That the great moments in the struggle of the human individual
constitute a chain, that this chain unites mankind across the
millennia like a range of human mountain peaks, that the sum-
mit of such a long-ago moment shall be for me still living, bright
and great - that is the fundamental idea of the faith in human-
ity which finds expression in the demand for a monumental
history.18
Misuse of monumental history can also hurt the past:
As long as the soul of historiography lies in the great stimuli
that a man of power derives from it, as long as the past has to be
described as worthy of imitation, as imitable and possible for a
second time, it of course incurs the danger of becoming some-
what distorted, beautified and coming close to free poetic inven-
tion; there have been ages, indeed, which were quite incapable of
distinguishing between a monumentalized past and a mythical
fiction, because precisely the same stimuli can be derived from
the one world as from the other. If, therefore, the monumental
mode of regarding history rules over the other modes-I
mean over the antiquarian and critical-the past itself suffers
harm ......
The danger of a judge's use of "monumentalism," even if we admit
that a judge is not exactly Nietzsche's "man of power,"20 lies in
that attitude's petrifaction of the past. By worshipping past events
and actors, the judge diminishes the significance of their present
successors. Further, each of the three kinds of history must be
used carefully:
17. Id. at 68, 73-76.
18. Id. at 68.
19. Id. at 70-71.
20. The reader should not confuse this "man of power" with Nietzsche's "superman."
Here, Nietzsche means only "a powerful man." For a definition of the "superman," see infra
note 31.
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If the man who wants to do something great has need of the
past at all, he appropriates it by means of monumental history;
he, on the other hand, who likes to persist in the familiar and
the revered of old, tends the past as an antiquarian historian;
and only he who is oppressed by a present need, and who wants
to throw off this burden at any cost, has need of critical history,
that is to say a history that judges and condemns. Much mis-
chief is caused through the thoughtless transplantation of these
plants: the critic without need, the antiquary without piety, the
man who recognizes greatness but cannot himself do great
things, are such plants, estranged from their mother soil and de-
generated into weeds.21
Each of these historical methods has its use, but one should not
employ one method to the detriment of the others. A judge who
goes too far with any one of them will err, as would a professional
historian.
The antiquarian historian longs for stability in the recounting of
the past. "History thus belongs in the second place to him who
preserves and reveres-to him who looks back to whence he has
come, to where he came into being, with love and loyalty; with this
piety he as it were gives thanks for his existence."22 The desire
always to preserve can be harmful to those who must live in the
present, for the antiquarian historian, by an obsessive concentra-
tion on preservation, is blind to the present.2 3 To Nietzsche,
overuse of antiquarianism stifles the "man of action ' 24 and im-
pedes the work of today. 5
Nietzsche's last category is critical history:
[Critical history] is an attempt to give oneself, as it were a pos-
teriori, a past in which one would like to originate in opposition
to that in which one did originate:-always a dangerous attempt
21. F. NmTZSCHE, supra note 16, at 72.
22. Id.
23. The details of the past reassure the antiquarian historian that his home has endured
and will endure: "Here we lived, he says to himself, for here we are living; and here we shall
live, for we are tough and not to be ruined overnight." Id. at 73.
24. "[T]he man of action. . ., as one who acts, will and must offend some Deity or an-
other." Id. at 75.
25. Id.
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because it is so hard to know the limit to denial of the past and
because second natures are usually weaker than first.26
The critical historian-judge will move the law in a new direc-
tion-in that direction where the law must go-by rereading or
"misreading" 27 the historical record to accommodate the new im-
pulse: "If he is to live, man must possess and from time to time
employ the strength to break up and dissolve a part of the past: he
does this by bringing it before the tribunal, scrupulously examin-
ing it and finally condemning it .... 25
In discussing the three types of history, Nietzsche wanted to
shift the focus of his contemporaries, who, he thought, cared more
for the past than for the present.2 9 He appealed to the best in his
contemporaries as they tried to read history:
To sum up: history is written by the experienced and superior
man. He who has not experienced greater and more exalted
things than others will not know how to interpret the great and
exalted things of the past. When the past speaks it always
speaks as an oracle: only if you are an architect of the future
and know the present will you understand it.30
Nietzsche's theory is thus somewhat limited for judges. If one
takes the theory on Nietzsche's terms, one must acknowledge that
few, if any, judges are supermen.3 1 One wonders what judges would
or could make of Nietzsche's essay. Certainly, they could recognize
26. Id. at 76.
27. See H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY 5 (1973).
28. F. NIETZSCHE, supra note 16, at 75-76.
29. Nietzsche may have been guilty of antiquarianism himself when he wrote:
[W]e moderns have nothing whatever of our own; only by replenishing and
cramming ourselves with the ages, customs, arts, philosophies, religions, dis-
coveries of others do we become anything worthy of notice, that is to say, walk-
ing encyclopedias, which is what an ancient Greek transported into our own
time would perhaps take us for.
Id., at 79.
30. Id. at 94.
31. Nietzsche expressed his conception of the superman (Uebermensch) in poetic terms.
Perhaps a useful shorthand definition would be a man who has realized his true self. See W.
KAUFMANN, NIETZSCHE 308 (4th ed. 1974). For a full discussion of Nietzsche's superman the-
ory, see id. at 307-16. Cf. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239-412 (1986); R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1977) (both discussing the mythical "perfect" judge "Hercules").
[Vol. 30:181
PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, AND JUDGING
their own and previous judges' uses of history in the way that
Nietzsche decries.
Today, the sophistication of the analytical method is less impor-
tant then its utility. As one commentator observed:
[T]he professional scholar's preference should not be for the his-
torical context that is simplest but for the context-whether
simple or complex-that has the greatest capacity to stimulate
research and expand the boundaries of knowledge. The capacity
of a thesis to expand knowledge, however, does not justify its
acceptance by a judge, whose main duty is to resolve cases on
the basis of existing knowledge, not to expand it. The only rea-
son for a judge to prefer a simple historical interpretation would
be a belief that it mirrored reality, but... reality is too complex
to be captured in any simple, unidimensional way.2
Historical Methods
In addition to Nietzsche's criticism, the historian must be aware
of other analytical challenges associated with historiography: per-
sonal bias, truthseeking, and the historian's educative function.
Historical philosophy assumes that historians strive for an objec-
tive truth; yet history is fundamentally subjective. Unless a histo-
rian merely lists facts without more, perhaps in the style of tables
and graphs, personal bias will enter the analysis in the historian's
very choice of material.33 No two historians need choose the same
sources in their retelling of the same past event.
Such personal bias becomes important when the subject is con-
stitutional history.34 The historian will write, consciously or uncon-
32. Nelson, supra note 10, at 1249 n.40.
33. Even a collection of tables and graphs will be biased; the historian chooses the mate-
rial to quantify and the scales to use. Such reliance on tables and graphs to tell the story is
called "quantitative" history. In the mid-twentieth century, historians argued over the ap-
propriateness and usefulness of this method of historiography; but now, "[s]cholarly battles
are fought . . . over where the proper borders of quantification are to be drawn." E.
BREISACH, HISTORIOGRAPHY: ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, AND MODERN 340 (1983).
34. It is not a unique historical task to deal with fragmentary sources, or to recon-
struct group intent in the preparation of a document, or to recognize that a
document contains compromises and a certain amount of general, even design-
edly imprecise, language. What is distinctive about the historical problem in
this instance is that it is not merely historical. It is also political. Because it is
concerned with the Constitution, historical research on the intent of the fram-
1988]
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sciously, from experience.3 5 Constitutional matters are profoundly
matters of self-government in the American system. The bias of a
judge-historian may have great effects on the lives of everyone
outside the court, although they have no opportunity to replace
the judge through election. Consequently, the judge should strive
always to insure that personal experience equals community
experience.3 6
The reader of a history may naturally assume its truth. Without
overt evidence of a historian's agenda, one often believes one is
reading the facts as they occurred. Such confidence, however, ig-
nores the fact that the historian is not an oracle, but rather a truth
seeker.37
Historians perform an educative function. Some are more obvi-
ous in their attempt than others, and some modern writers of his-
tory may desire less teaching and more presenting. Yet historical
tradition counsels otherwise:
Most people get their ideas of civic virtue, of what constitutes
patriotic and heroic conduct, from their histories. From the
same source they also get their general views of the course of
human events and of the factors which determine it. Thus, clas-
sic historians, Livy, Tacitus, and Plutarch, preached the value of
liberty and of patriotic service to country. Modern romantic his-
torians similarly preach the virtue of barbaric strength and of
the unsophisticated and untutored simplicity and love of free-
dom of the barbaric invaders of France and England, for exam-
ers at once becomes a contemporary public issue with contemporary public
consequences.
C. MILLER, supra note 1, at 159.
35. See M. COHEN, supra note 5, at 20.
36. See Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986).
37. See F. NIETZSCHE, supra text accompanying note 30 ("When the past speaks it always
speaks as an oracle .... "); see also M. COHEN, supra note 5:
The actual writers of history are fallible human beings subject not only to
bias but also to that limited capacity for knowledge that characterizes all
humans. Even if our historian is a most accurate observer and completely im-
partial the amount he can observe for himself is generally a very small part of
what he narrates. For the most part he must rely on the testimony of others.
Now we know how unreliable are even eye-witnesses of any striking event or
accident, how conflicting is their testimony. We discover this unreliability,
however, only when we have a multiplicity of witnesses or else independent
circumstantial evidence such as fingerprints or other material remains.
Id. at 18.
190 [Vol. 30:181
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ple. History written in this vein is hardly distinguishable from
mythology, but must not every historian write history in terms
of the social values that he recognizes?"8
Recognizing the subjective quality of the historical effort, one
should not condemn histories as merely "stories," but instead use
the creative quality of history to one's advantage. Such an ap-
proach could avoid the artificiality of much discussion about his-
torical events.39
Nevertheless, the historian's creative effort may lead to analyti-
cal fallacies that impede a reasonable understanding. Giambattista
Vico noted three prejudices, or sources of error, against which his-
torians have to be always on their guard: first, the notion that
"whenever men can form no idea of distant and unknown things,
they judge them by what is familiar and at hand";4 0 second, the
38. L. COHEN, supra note 5, at 26.
39. It is a common error, for instance, to suppose that the framers of the American
Constitution were clear in their own minds as to whether they intended to give
the courts power to declare statutes unconstitutional. We cannot always read
into the past a contemporaneous awareness of issues that have become clear
and important to us. The historian must put himself imaginatively before the
event he describes in order to appreciate the standards prevailing at the time
of action and thus to estimate the possibilities of which the actual event is only
one.
Id. at 80.
So obviously has it seemed necessary to adopt the categories of the modem
"developed" legal system that much of legal history has become a sort of legal
embryology-a search for the rudimentary forms of the "full-grown" legal sys-
tem. The present becomes the culmination of all the past, and the present
forms of institutions seem to be their inevitable forms. The imagination is thus
closed to the infinite possibilities of history.
Boorstin, Tradition and Method in Legal History, 54 HARV. L. REv. 424, 428-29 (1941).
In James Joyce's Ulysses, Stephen Dedalus meditates on history while teaching a class of
young schoolboys about the Romans:
Had Pyrrhus not fallen by a beldam's hand in Argos or Julius Caesar not
been knifed to death. They are not to be thought away. Time has branded
them and fettered they are lodged in the room of the infinite possibilities they
have ousted. But can those have been possible seeing that they never were? Or
was that only possible which came to pass? Weave, weaver of the wind.
J. JoYCE, 1 ULYSSES 49 (H.W. Gabler ed. 1984).
40. G. Vico, supra note 3, at 60.
This axiom points to the inexhaustible source of all the errors about the
principles of humanity that have been adopted by entire nations and by all the
scholars. For when the former began to take notice of them and the latter to
investigate them, it was on the basis of their own enlightened, cultivated, and
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"conceit of nations": "Every nation, . .. whether Greek or barba-
rian, has had the same conceit that it before all other nations in-
vented the comforts of human life and that its remembered history
goes back to the very beginning of the world";41 third, the conceit
of "scholars, who will have it that what they know is as old as the
world .... -42 The historian should "re-enact the past in his own
mind, ' 4 but he should acknowledge that this is what he is doing,
not reconstructing "the real past" from the materials that he finds.
In doing so, the historian's power can be great."
JUDICIAL USES OF HISTORY
The problems of historiography previously discussed attain a
special status in the area of judicial decision making. Judges have
used history since the founding of the republic to support their
decisions." Yet, they seldom have questioned each other on the
very propriety of this adjudicative method. "History cannot answer
or even address the question of whether modern Americans ought
to obey the intentions of the Constitution's founders. That ques-
tion belongs to political theory (or philosophy) or constitutional
law and must be answered in the terms of those other spheres of
discourse." 46 Not all Americans, including some of the country's
philosophers and poets, share this high regard for history in
America's courtrooms. 47 The Supreme Court is loath to break with
tradition, however, and looking to history to resolve present dis-
putes is a practice as old as the Court itself.48 By invoking the
magnificent times that they judged the origins of humanity, which must never-
theless by the nature of things have been small, crude, and quite obscure.
Id.
41. Id. at 61.
42. Id. Vico states two other principles that have some relevance for legal discussion:
"Men of limited ideas take for law what the words expressly say." Id. at 93. "Intelligent men
take for law whatever impartial utility dictates in each case." Id. at 94.
43. R. COLLINGWOOD, supra note 6, at 282.
44. "Gibbon was able to use history to sustain a body of social theory that profoundly
affected the thought of his own and subsequent generations." Nelson, supra note 10, at 1243
n.18.
45. See Kelly, supra note 11, at 119-21.
46. Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659, 662 (1987).
47. See M. COHEN, supra note 5, at 16-17.
48. In one sense.... the Supreme Court has always used history. Indeed, any examina-
tion of the problem requires some rather careful consideration of what the "use of history"
[Vol. 30:181
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"long-lost intent" of the Constitution's framers, the Court can le-
gitimate its decisions.49
Such use and abuse of history by the Court sparks fierce con-
flicts among the Justices. Justice X's creative invocation of history
will undoubtedly offend the sensibilities of Justice Y, although
Justice Y did the same to X in a previous case. Justice Jackson
described the problem thirty-six years ago:
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned
had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from
materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called
upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan
debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only
supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on
each side of any question. They largely cancel each other.50
Divining the intention of the framers of the Constitution is cer-
tainly a difficult task, about which commentators have written a
great deal, especially in recent years.5 1 Although the difficulty of
the task as a general constitutional method is understood, the use-
by the Court implies. There is, after all, a fairly close relationship between the day-to-day
methodology of the judicial process and that of historical scholarship. When a court ascer-
tains the nature of the law to be applied to a case through an examination of a stream of
judicial precedent, after the time-honored Anglo-American technique, it plays the role of
historian. A historian might well say that in this process the court goes to the "primary
sources."
Kelly, supra note 11, at 121.
49. See id. at 131-32. "The originalist's invocation of history must further the task of
explicating what the people adopted, or it is an arbitrary attempt to impose the dead hand
of the past on the contemporary polity-a sort of political ancestor-worship." Powell, supra
note 46, at 666-67.
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). See C. MILLER, supra note 1, at 156-57.
51. See, e.g., Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013 (1984); Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARv. L. REV. 1189 (1987); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); Garet, Com-
parative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 58 S. CAL. L. REv.
35 (1985); Nash, In re Radical Interpretations of American Law: The Relation of Law and
History, 82 MICH. L. REv. 274 (1983); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason:
A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551 (1985); Simon, The
Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional
"Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 603 (1985); Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Consti-
tutional Theory, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1502 (1985); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983).
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fulness of its application is disputed. At times, the Court has rec-
ognized that a blind adherence to a putative "original intent" is
undesirable, if not impossible.52 Dangers exist, not only in the
Court's ignorance of historical method, but also in its rigid adher-
ence to particular historical theories.53
A more flexible approach to our nation's past is required, one
which recognizes the limitations of the historical effort. Flexibility,
not rigidity, should be the rule.54 The Supreme Court Justice, act-
52. If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adop-
tion it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Consti-
tution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the con-
ditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement
carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception
that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning-"We must never
forget that it is a constitution that we are expounding ... a constitution in-
tended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs."
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934) (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819)). See Bickel, The Original Understand-
ing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1955).
Justice Brennan's statement in 1963 applies as well to many cases today in which the
Supreme Court uses "history" of the eighteenth century to reach its result: "Whatever Jef-
ferson or Madison would have thought of Bible reading or the recital of the Lord's Prayer in
what few public schools existed in their day, our use of the history of their time must limit
itself to broad purposes, not specific practices." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 241 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). "We have recognized in a wide variety of constitu-
tional contexts that the practices that were in place at the time any particular guarantee
was enacted into the Constitution do not necessarily fix forever the meaning of that guaran-
tee." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Justice Holmes believed that the Court should not import a sophisticated current phi-
losophy into the Constitution, and therefore undermine democracy: "This case is decided
upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain .... The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan criticized the Court for reading a foreign "principle" into the Constitution:
Today's holding is that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires every State to structure its legislature so that all the members of
each house represent substantially the same number of people; other factors
may be given play only to the extent that they do not significantly encroach on
this basic "population" principle. Whatever may be thought of this holding as
a piece of political ideology-.. .- I think it demonstrable that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not impose this political tenet on the States or authorize this
Court to do so.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54. We are guided in our search of the past by our own aspirations and evolving
principles, which were in part formed by that very past. When we find in his-
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ing as historian, should recognize the personal role that the Justice
plays in creating that history, always keeping one eye on the pre-
sent while searching the recesses of the past for clues to constitu-
tional meaning.5 Benjamin Cardozo recognized such flexibility as
both a desideratum and a practical reality in constitutional cases:
The great generalities of the constitution have a content and a
significance that vary from age to age. The method of free deci-
sion sees through the transitory particulars and reaches what is
permanent behind them. Interpretation, thus enlarged, becomes
more than the ascertainment of the meaning and intent of
lawmakers whose collective will has been declared. It supple-
ments the declaration, and fills the vacant spaces, by the same
processes and methods that have built up the customary law.56
Justice Frankfurter wrote: "If individual words are inexact sym-
bols, with shifting variables, their configuration can hardly achieve
invariant meaning or assured definiteness. '57
tory, immanent or expressed, principles that we can adopt or adapt, or ideals
and aspirations that speak with contemporary relevance, we find at the same
time evidence of inconsistent conduct. But we reason from the former, not
from the frailties of men who, like ourselves, did not always live up to all they
professed or aspired to.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 109-10 (2d ed. 1986).
55. See Bickel, supra note 52, at 59.
56. B. CARDoZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDmlAL PROCESS 17 (1949). A more cynical commen-
tator described the judicial application of precedent as profoundly affected by the judge's
own perceptions and values:
There is no precedent that cannot be distinguished away if you want to distin-
guish it. The use of a precedent always implies a value judgment, a judgment
that similarities between the precedent and the following decision are impor-
tant and that dissimilarities are relatively unimportant. The application of pre-
cedent thus always involves a process of selection or discrimination. But one
man's pattern of selectivity is not the same as another man's.
Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 246 (1950).
57. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528
(1947).
A good example of the Court's creative use of history is Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954). There, the Supreme Court ruled that racial discrimination in public schools in the
District of Columbia was a denial of due process of law. In reaching the result, the Court
noted: "Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since
they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect." Id. at 499 (emphasis
added) (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) and Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). The converse of this statement seems true: racial
classifications had been firmly embedded in the practice of the United States and its gov-
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In looking toward a flexible, creative use of history, the Supreme
Court could learn from literature. The writer of a historical novel,
for example, may invent characters who never existed, or change
the accepted view of history to suit the work's purposes .5  The
judge who writes opinions with such creative freedom will necessa-
rily run into the self-erected judicial boundaries. A judge who
knows how to use history creatively, but who is willing to set limits
on fancy, is the paradigm. The judge would do well to keep in
mind Nietzsche's warning of the dangers of critical history.59
THE ALABAMA RELIGION CASES: CREATIVE HISTORY IN PRACTICE
Having discussed how a judge might use history creatively in or-
der to reach an otherwise elusive result, this Note next considers
some recent opinions illustrating the creative use of history in
practice. In Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners,"0 Judge
Brevard Hand of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama attacked the United States Supreme Court's
use of history in deciding cases under the first amendment's reli-
gion clauses.6' On appeal to the Supreme Court,62 the opinions of
ernment since its inception. See A.L. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR (1978) (dis-
cussing slavery laws in colonial America).
58. The novelist Horace Walpole wrote, "I have often said that History in general is a
romance that is believed, and that Romance is a History that is not believed; and that I do
not see much other difference between them." G. DAY, FROM FICTION TO THE NOVEL 7 (1987)
(quoting 15 HORACE WALPOLE'S CORRESPONDENCE 173 (W. Lewis ed. 1951)). Oscar Wilde
encouraged the literary critic to change the past through a critical effort of the present:
The one duty we owe to history is to rewrite it. That is not the least of the
tasks in store for the critical spirit. When we have fully discovered the scien-
tific laws that govern life, we shall realize that the one person who has more
illusions than the dreamer is the man of action. He, indeed, knows neither the
origin of his deeds nor their results. From the field in which he thought that he
had sown thorns, we have gathered our vintage, and the fig-tree that he
planted for our pleasure is as barren as the thistle, and more bitter. It is be-
cause Humanity has never known where it was going that it has been able to
find its way.
0. WILDE, The Critic as Artist, in THE ARTIST AS CRITIC: CRITICAL WRITINGS OF OSCAR
WILDE 359 (R. Ellmann ed. 1969).
59. See supra text accompanying note 26.
60. 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th
Cir. 1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
61. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
62. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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the Court (majority, concurrences, and dissents) all discussed the
subject of history as it related to the issue on appeal-whether Al-
abama's statute authorizing a one-minute moment of silence in
public schools for "meditation or voluntary prayer" s was unconsti-
tutional. On remand, Judge Hand removed from the Mobile
County public schools textbooks that allegedly advocated the be-
liefs of "secular humanism" and thus violated the first and four-
teenth amendments as an establishment of religion. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lat-
ter case, Smith v. Board of School Commissioners," without re-
gard to issues of historical interpretation. 5 The ultimate results of
these cases are not as important, however, as the reasoning of the
judges who decided them-for their reasoning will affect future
cases.
Wallace v. Jafiree
The Trial Court
Ishmael Jaffree, whose children attended public schools in Mo-
bile County, Alabama, brought suit in the Southern District of Al-
abama seeking a declaration that "certain prayer activities" 66 in
his children's school violated the establishment clause of the
United States Constitution. He also sought an injunction against
these activities.6 7 One of the teachers in the schools led her stu-
dents in a daily prayer, apparently before lunchtime.6 8 Another
teacher had her class recite the Lord's Prayer. 9
In analyzing the issue before him, Judge Hand looked first to the
Supreme Court's precedent on school prayer. He examined Engel
63. Id. at 40.
64. 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987).
65. 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
66. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
67. Id.
68. The prayer was:
God is great, God is good,
Let us thank him for our food,
Bow our heads we all are fed,
Give us Lord our daily bread.
Amen!
Id. at 1107. Another teacher led her class in an abbreviated version of this prayer. Id.
69. Id.
19881
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
v. Vitale,70 and found the Court's historical discussion in that case
unconvincing: "The assertion by the Court that the establishment
clause of the first amendment applied to the states was unaccom-
panied by any citation to authority. This conclusion was reached
-supposedly upon its examination of historical documents. '71
Next, Hand reviewed Abington School District v. Schempp,72
which found that the requirement of separation of church and
state forbade Bible readings in public schools. Hand wrote that
"[t]he Court in Abington reasoned from its own precedent rather
than independently reviewing the historical foundation of the first
and fourteenth amendments. 7 3 Dissatisfied with the Supreme
Court's historical analysis of the meaning of the establishment
clause, Hand stated that the "intent" of his opinion was "to take
us back to our original historical roots .. .
The court then discussed the defendants' two theories: first, the
framers intended the first amendment to apply only to the federal
government, and second, the fourteenth amendment did not incor-
porate the first amendment against the states.75 Hand relied on a
historian, James McClellan, who testified at trial, to shed light on
the original meaning of the first amendment. McClellan stated that
ten of the fourteen states that adopted the Constitution "placed
Protestants in a preferred status over Catholics, Jews, and
Dissenters. '76
In attacking the famous wall between church and state, Hand
enlisted the aid of another historian, Robert Cord. Cord challenged
the traditional interpretation of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison as believers in separation of church and state in his book
Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fic-
70. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
71. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
72. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
73. 554 F. Supp. at 1112.
74. Id. at 1113 n.5.
75. Id. at 1113.
76. Id. at 1115. Perhaps encouraged by McClellan's testimony, Hand warned later in the
opinion that "[a] member of a religious minority will have to develop a thicker skin if a
state establishment offends him. Tender years are no exception." Id. at 1118 n.24. See also 3
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1867, 1871 (1970)
(1st ed. 1833) (object of first amendment was to prevent oppression of Christian minorities,
not to protect members of other religions).
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tion.7 7 In that work, Cord interpreted Jefferson's "wall of separa-
tion" to mean only that the federal government could not establish
a national religion or forbid free exercise."8
Moving to the defendants' second theory, Hand found that
"[t]he historical record clearly establishes that when the four-
teenth amendment was ratified in 1868... its ratification did not
incorporate the first amendment against the states. 7  Here, Hand
relied on Charles Fairman's famous article criticizing the historical
method of Justice Hugo Black.80 For Hand, the "paramount con-
sideration" in interpreting the Constitution was legislative intent
rather than Supreme Court precedent.8 " He explored the legislative
history and concluded that "Mr. Justice Black misread the con-
gressional debate surrounding the passage of the fourteenth
amendment when he concluded that Congress intended to incorpo-
rate the federal Bill of Rights against the states. '8 2
After reviewing the historical materials, Judge Hand paused to
consider the options open to him. He found two methods of inter-
preting the Constitution. The first was to attempt to ascertain the
original intent of the framers of the document, and hew faithfully
to that intent; the second was to "treat the Constitution as a living
document, chameleon-like in its complexion, which changes to suit
the needs of the times and the whims of the interpreters." '
77. R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE. HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION
(1982). One reviewer called the book "a work of crank constitutional law." Tushnet, Book
Review, 45 LA. L. REv. 175, 175 (1984). Professor Tushnet added that "[cranks] routinely
find it difficult to tolerate ambiguity." Id. at 177.
78. .CORD, supra note 77, at xiv.
79. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (S.D. Ala. 1983)
80. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L.
REV. 5 (1949).
81. 554 F. Supp. at 1119-20. Here Hand quoted the Supreme Court itself: "The intention
of the lawmaker is the law." Id. at 1120 (quoting Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212'
(1903) (quoting Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 374, 380 (1874))).
82. Id. at 1122. Here Judge Hand parted company with Robert Cord, who wrote that the
fourteenth amendment did incorporate the establishment clause against the states. Hand
wrote that "Cord uncritically adopted the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in
reaching his conclusion." Id. at 1124 n.33.
83. Id. at 1126 (emphasis added).
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Hand's choice of language revealed his preference: he would "inter-
pret the Constitution as its drafters and adopters intended." 4
The Supreme Court's interpretation, however, stands in the way
of a district judge who differs with it. Unlike the Supreme Court,
which can overrule its own decisions, a lower federal judge has no
such power.8 5 Judge Hand apparently did not feel constrained by
the traditional role of the district courts in the federal system-he
found a way to reverse the United States Supreme Court. First, he
quoted Justice William 0. Douglas, who wrote that the Constitu-
tion is more important than what other judges may have written
about it.s6 Hand then quoted other Justices and commentators to
justify his decision to "overrule" Everson v. Board of Education8 7
and the other cases mandating strict separation of church and
state."8 Hand also discussed Justice John Paul Stevens's difference
with the Court's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in Runyon v.
McCrary.8 In that case, Justice Stevens had joined the majority's
opinion because of the weight of precedent, although he made clear
that he disagreed with the Court's prior interpretation of the stat-
ute.90 Judge Hand found Justice Stevens's surrender to be almost a
breach of duty: "Where Mr. Justice Stevens was unwilling to dis-
84. Id. "Let us have faith in the rightness of our charter and the patience to persevere in
adhering to its principles. If we do so then all will have input into change and not just a
few." Id.
85. Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 47 n.26 (1985).
86. "A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to reverse past
history and accept what was once written. But he remembers above all else that it is the
Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors
may have put on it." 554 F. Supp. at 1127 (quoting Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUm L.
REV. 735, 736 (1949)).
87. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
88. 554 F. Supp. at 1126-28.
89. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). The Supreme Court recently voted to reexamine this decision.
See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988). Justice Stevens, however,
dissented from the vote to reconsider Runyon. See id. at 1422 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. See 427 U.S. at 189-90. Compare Justice Harlan's view of precedent with Justice Ste-
vens's: "[M]y usual practice is to adhere until the end of Term to views I have expressed in
dissent during the Term. . . ." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 744 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Harlan's usual practice was to continue for
the duration of a Term to adhere to his positions expressed in dissents. After the end of the
Term he would consider himself bound by the precedent he had originally opposed."
Bourguignon, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: His Principles of Judicial Decision Making,
1979 Sup. CT. REv. 251, 279-80.
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sent from his brethren in a case involving statutory construction,
this Court feels a stronger tug from the Constitution which it has
sworn to support and to defend."91
Supposing that he might be only "a voice crying in the wilder-
ness," 92 Hand concluded that the Supreme Court's historical inter-
pretation of the meaning of the establishment clause was faulty.9 3
He concluded that, because the establishment clause of the federal
Constitution "does not prohibit the state from establishing a reli-
gion, the prayers offered by the teachers in this case are not
unconstitutional. 9 4
The United States Court of Appeals
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
consolidated Jafiree v. Board of School Commissioners with Jaf-
free v. James.5 Jaffree challenged school prayer activities that
were unrelated to the three Alabama statutes which mandated a
one-minute "period of silence" and authorized Alabama public
school teachers to lead the students in prayer.9 8 The court found
the statutes unconstitutional.9 7 Unlike Judge Hand, the court of
appeals did not make its own investigation into the history of the
establishment clause. In the view of the Eleventh Circuit, the Su-
preme Court had the sole responsibility of making historical deter-
minations: "[Tihe Supreme Court has considered and decided the
historical implications surrounding the establishment clause. The
Supreme Court has concluded that its present interpretation of the
first and fourteenth amendments is consistent with the historical
evidence."98 The court of appeals also found that Judge Hand had
misunderstood the role of stare decisis in the federal system: "Ju-
dicial precedence serves as the foundation of our federal judicial
system. Adherence to it results in stability and predictability. If
91. 554 F. Supp. at 1128 n.39.
92. Id. at 1128.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1529 n.2 (11th Cir. 1983).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1536.
98. Id. at 1532.
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the Supreme Court errs, no other court may correct it." 99 The
court then reversed Judge Hand's dismissal of the actions and
remanded. 00
The United States Supreme Court
Before deciding on the constitutionality of the Alabama prayer
statute,1 °' the Supreme Court felt required to reaffirm its earlier
cases holding that the first amendment applies to the states. Judge
Hand had ruled that because the state of Alabama was free to es-
tablish religion, the prayer statute must stand. 10 2 The Supreme
Court found this a "remarkable conclusion.'
03
Perhaps shocked by Judge Hand's lengthy criticism that the
Court had erred from historical truth, T the Supreme Court pro-
ceeded to reaffirm its analysis. The Court agreed with Hand, inso-
far as he had argued that the first amendment was not originally
intended to apply against the states. 0 5 Hand's analysis of the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment, however, did not sway the
Court. The incorporation of the first amendment in the fourteenth
amendment's due-process clause' 08 was an "elementary proposition
of law.' 1 07
Turning next to the significance of the "original intent" of those
who drafted and ratified the first amendment, the Court admitted
that those framers probably would not have found any protection
in the amendment for non-Christians. 08 "But when the underlying
99. Id. at 1533.
100. Id. at 1537.
101. The Supreme Court determined that the narrow issue on appeal was whether the
statute "authoriz[ing] a period of silence for 'meditation or voluntary prayer,' is a law re-
specting the establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment." Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1985).
102. See supra text accompanying note 94.
103. 472 U.S. at 48.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
106. "No State shall . . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985).
108. "At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed the preference of one
Christian sect over another, but would not require equal respect for the conscience of the
infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism." Id.
at 52.
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principle has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court
has concluded unambiguously that the individual freedom of con-
science protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to
select any religious faith or none at all."'10 9 Unlike Judge Hand,
who preferred a history of safe literalisms,110 the Court reached be-
neath the obvious meaning of the constitutional text to find the
meaning better suited to the needs of today's pluralistic nation.
The Court, as it had done in earlier establishment clause deci-
sions,"' essentially rewrote history, and fashioned a first-amend-
ment principle to fit the country's spiritual needs. The five mem-
bers of the majority thus explicitly endorsed a flexible
interpretation of the religion clauses, an interpretation that has ex-
panded the clauses' protection with time.
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment," 2 wrote that reli-
ance on history to reach the result that the prayer statute was con-
stitutional was not improper: "Particularly when we are interpret-
ing the Constitution, 'a page of history is worth a volume of
logic."'s She conceded that a burden lies on those who would
challenge long-established practices.1 4 She could not be satisfied,
however, even assuming that the intent of the framers on this issue
would be dispositive, that such a statute would pass muster under
the eyes of the drafters and ratifiers of the first amendment:
"When the intent of the Framers is unclear, I believe we must em-
ploy both history and reason in our analysis.... Although history
provides a touchstone for constitutional problems, the Establish-
ment Clause concern for religious liberty is dispositive here."' 1
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, attempted to demonstrate the in-
accuracy of the Court's historical analysis through the years. 116
The invocation of Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation" had led
to poor results because of the Court's misconception of history:
109. Id. at 52-53 (emphasis added).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25 for discussion of Nietzsche's "antiquarian
historian."
111. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
112. Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
113. Id. at 79 (1985) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
114. Id. at 80. O'Connor noted, however, that school prayer statutes were not in fact long-
established. Id.
115. Id. at 81.
116. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Thomas Jefferson was of course in France at the time the consti-
tutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed
by Congress and ratified by the States. His letter to the Dan-
bury Baptist Association was a short note of courtesy, written 14
years after the Amendments were passed by Congress. He would
seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of con-
temporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment.117
Rehnquist was unable to use the majority's "principle" of the first
amendment because he found the obvious historical facts over-
whelming. For both Rehnquist and Hand,11 the correct principle
was an adherence to the historically demonstrated original intent
of the framers." 9 Rehnquist did not merely repeat Judge Hand's
historical analysis-he went to the primary sources himself in or-
der to glean the meaning of the past.120
Justice Rehnquist would use this rediscovered historical under-
standing to depart from the twentieth-century establishment
clause cases. He was unafraid of overturning years of precedent to
do this. "[Sitare decisis may bind courts as to matters of law, but
it cannot bind them as to matters of history."'' Unlike Judge
Hand, however, Justice Rehnquist was unwilling to overrule the in-
corporation doctrine. 22 Rehnquist argued that even if the first
amendment did apply to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Alabama prayer statutes were constitutional because of
the original intent behind the first amendment.
Rehnquist's dissent repeatedly appealed to "history" as he inter-
preted it. That "history" taught Rehnquist that the first amend-
117. Id. at 92.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 75-82.
119. "[Our Establishment Clause cases have been neither principled nor unified....
[Tihe greatest injury of the 'wall [of separation]' notion is its mischievous diversion of
judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights." 472 U.S. at 107
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
120. Rehnquist relied on J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1891) and
the writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Rehnquist cited Hand's historian
Robert Cord as well. 472 U.S. at 104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 99. "There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the
Framers intended to build the 'wall of separation' that was constitutionalized in Everson."
Id. at 106.
122. Id. at 113.
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ment "forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade
preference among religious sects or denominations. 1 2' "The true
meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its his-
tory, ' 124 Rehnquist asserted; "[i]f a constitutional theory has no
basis in the history of the amendment it seeks to interpret, is diffi-
cult to apply and yields unprincipled results, I see little use in
it.,"125
Smith v. Board of School Commissioners
Judge Brevard Hand noted at the end of his opinion in Jaffree v.
Board of School Commissioners2 ' that, if reversed on appeal,
"then this Court will look again at the record in this case and
reach conclusions which it is not now forced to reach.' 27 In a foot-
note, Hand wrote:
[C]ase law deals generally with removing the teachings of the
Christian ethic from the scholastic effort but totally ignores the
teaching of the secular humanist ethic. It was pointed out in the
testimony that the curriculum in the public schools of Mobile
County is rife with efforts at teaching or encouraging secular hu-
manism-all without opposition from any other ethic-to such
an extent that it becomes a brainwashing effort. If this Court is
compelled to purge "God is great, God is good, we thank Him
for our daily food" from the classroom, then this Court must
also purge from the classroom those things that serve to teach
that salvation is through one's self rather than through a
deity.128
Faithful to this intention, Judge Hand attempted to purge "secular
humanist" textbooks from Mobile County's classrooms in Smith v.
123. Id. at 106.
124. Id. at 113.
125. Id. at 112. To Rehnquist, only the framers' intentions are controlling today: "Any
deviation from their intentions frustrates the permanence of [the Constitution] and will
only lead to the type of unprincipled decisionmaking that has plagued our Establishment
Clause cases since Everson." Id. at 113.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 66-94.
127. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1129 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
128. Id. at 1129 n.41.
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Board of School Commissioners,2 the Jaffree case on remand
from the Eleventh Circuit.
The bulk of Hand's opinion in Smith was devoted to trial testi-
mony which, he believed, showed that secular humanism is a reli-
gion. 30 The court sifted through conflicting testimony on the be-
liefs and practices of secular humanism. In concluding that secular
humanism is a religion, Judge Hand scolded a witness, Dr. Paul
Kurtz, a self-proclaimed secular humanist, for his misuse of
history:
Dr. Paul Kurtz testified that secular humanism is a scientific
methodology, not a religious movement. In his testimony he at-
tempted to make a case that humanism generally, and secular
humanism in particular, is the entire body of western philosoph-
ical and scientific thought. He thus attempted to claim for this
ideology the heritage of learning found in all prior western civili-
zations. Dr. Kurtz's attempt to revise history to comply with his
personal beliefs is of no concern to this Court.'3 '
After this reprimand, the court defended history against those
who would seek to waylay it:
This Court is not in the business of writing, or rewriting, his-
tory texts. But it is this Court's solemn duty and obligation
under the first and fourteenth amendments as interpreted by
the Supreme Court . . . to protect the rights of these plaintiffs
and defendants to the free exercise of their various religions,
unimpaired by an officially sponsored version of history that ig-
nores the facts that give the first amendment its importance and
significance."3 2
Judge Hand's commitment to "history" is ironic; indeed, he seems
to have learned nothing from the Supreme Court's discussion of
constitutional history in Wallace v. Jaffree. 33
129. 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987). Hand realigned the parties, so that students, par-
ents, and teachers who had been defendant-intervenors in Jaffree became plaintiffs in order
to address their claim of the county's establishment of "secular humanism" in the class-
room. Id. at 943-44.
130. Id. at 980-83.
131. Id. at 982.
132. Id. at 985.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 104-11.
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CONCLUSION
Judges will continue to appeal to history as they try to decide
the controversies of the present. Their judgments will always be
limited, however, by their own idea of history. An awareness that
history as a concept has a fluid meaning"" and that the very
"facts" that make up history can change would yield more satisfac-
tory results. A judge's own philosophy of history-static or
fluid-will affect the judge's reading of history. With this realiza-
tion comes new insight into the judicial decision-making process.
Donald P. Boyle, Jr.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 26-59.
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